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 Key concerns of elections 
 - Trust 
 - Transparency  
 
 
 
       VS 
 
 
 
 Paper-ballot Voting       E-Voting System 
 
Voter 
Verifiability 
• Vote Receipt 
 
Universal 
Verifiability 
• Bulletin Board 
E2E 
Verifiability 
 Helios 
› Open-source web-based open-audit voting 
system that offers verifiable online elections for 
anyone (B. Adida, 2008). 
 
› Ensures ballot secrecy and election integrity (low 
coercion) 
 
› Divided into two main categories: 
 Ballot Preparation 
 Ballot Casting 
 Smart Ballot Tracker and Ballot Tracking Center (Bulletin 
Board) for vote verification 
 
Fig. 1 Ballot Tracking Center of Helios Voting System 
Fig. 2 Helios Smart Ballot Tracker 
 
 Scantegrity II 
› Practical enhancement for optical scan voting 
systems that achieves increased election 
integrity through a novel use of confirmation 
codes printed on ballots in invisible inks (Chaum 
et. all, 2008). 
 
› Improved version of two optical scan voting 
systems: 
 Punchscan 
 Scantegrity 
 
› Invisible Inks Technology 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Process of Invisible Ink Printing  
 
 Prêt à Voter 
› Paper-based ballot E2E voting system that 
ensures ballot secrecy and anonymity through 
the implementation of mix-net scheme. 
 
› System’s stages: 
 Ballot Generation 
 Vote Capture 
 Vote Processing 
 Auditing 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Prêt à Voter’s sample ballot 
 
 Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES) 
› Combination of paper-based and non paper-
based ballot voting systems with the assistance 
of its administrator called TTPI (Trusted Third Party 
Internetstemmen). 
  
› Applied for the first time in 2004 Water Boards 
Election at Rijnland and De Dommel. 
 
› Vote Casting: 
 by Registered Mail 
 Electronically  
 
› System’s stages: 
 Initial Stage 
 Election Stage 
 Tally Stage 
 
 
 
 
 The implementation of cryptography and 
steganography in E2E voter verifiable remote 
electronic voting  
 
 Cryptography is the art and science of keeping 
messages secure (B. Schneier, 1996), while 
Steganography is the art and science of hiding 
communication (Provos and Honeyman, 2003). 
 
 Three Types of Users: 
› Administrators 
› Election Officers 
› Voters 
 
 
 
Registration 
• Voter’s registration process of eligible voters (identified 
by their respective organization’s e-mail address).  
Authentication 
• Common login process with the implementation of 
password hashing to protect the voters’ passwords. 
Voting 
• Encoded votes (visual cryptography) are distributed 
to the server and the voter as a receipt  
Tallying 
• Votes counting process by the officers (distributed 
keys is required to be presented all together)   
Publishing and Vote Verification 
• Voting result publication and verification through 
Bulletin Board 
Fig. 5 Homepage of eVote voting 
system (officer’s level) 
Fig. 6 eVote system voting verification 
feature. 
Fig. 7 eVote’s 
sample ballot 
receipt 
 
 Requirements: 
› Functional Requirements 
› Usability Requirements 
› Security Requirements 
 
 Threats: 
› Internal Threats Sources 
› External Threats Sources 
 Randomization Attack 
 Simulation Attack 
 Forced-abstention Attack 
 DoS Attack 
› Comparison of E2E Voting Systems based-on 
E2E System Requirements 
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› Comparison of E2E Voting Systems based-on 
its Defense Mechanism against External 
Threats Sources 
Threats 
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› We believe the implementation of cryptography and 
steganography schemes in eVote system are 
sufficient to provide a secure, reliable and 
convenient voting system for medium range 
election. 
 
› However, based on our comparison we found out 
that E2E voting systems are not fully resistant over 
attacks from the adversary. They can only fulfil a 
certain level of security.  
 
› Ergo, flexible system would be the best option at this 
moment. The users could adjust the system easily 
according to their skills and requirements. 

